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I. INTRODUCTION
The contemporary student of tort law cannot help but be struck
by two dominant and recurring themes. First, there is the "setting"
in which modern, or at least post-1963, tort law is typically pre-
sented.' Much the same as in a contemporary course in criminal
procedure, where the material is often analyzed in the context of the
"tension" between individual rights and freedom and the public
policy necessity of dealing effectively with criminal activity, so in
torts the subject is taught in the context of the "tension" between
negligence and strict liability.2 Although this is generally true of
nearly every area of tort law, whether nuisance, ultrahazardous ac-
tivities or invasion of privacy, it is especially true of the products
liability area. Moreover, this so-called "tension" between and juxta-
position of these two bases of liability is the recurring theme both
in general torts law case -books, as well as in more specialized texts
and monographs devoted exclusively to the increasingly complex
and specialized area of products liability law. '
The second dominant and recurring theme of modern tort law in
general, and of product liability law in particular, is that of the
"enormous" doctrinal shifts which have occurred beginning with
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sity Law Center, 1980.
It was in 1963, in the landmark case of Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal.2d
57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963), that California became the first jurisdiction in the
United States to adopt strict tort liability for defective products. Shortly thereafter, and
based almost exclusively on Greenman and a New York products liability case involving a
breach of warranty (Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 191 N.E.2d 81,
240 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1963)), the American Law Institute adopted what has perhaps become the
best known and most often applied section of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A
(1965), which sets forth the essential elements of strict product liability.
I See, e.g., C. GREGORY, H. KALVEN, & R. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (3d ed.
1977).
1 E.g., see D. NOEL & J. PHILLIPS, PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN A NUTSHELL (1974).
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Judge Cardozo's landmark decision in MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co.,' abolishing the necessity of the plaintiff's showing that he was
in privity of contract with the defendant, and (in some sense) ending
with Judge Traynor's decision in Greenman v. Yuba Power Prod-
ucts, Inc.,5 abolishing the plaintiff's need to prove negligence on the
part of the manufacturer in the design and/or production of his
product.' The expansion of the strict liability framework to the area
of product liability effectively relieved the plaintiff of showing both
that he was a member of a class of persons to whom the defendant
owed a duty of care and, that given the duty, the defect in the
defendant's product which caused the plaintiff's injury was the re-
sult of the defendant's failure to exercise reasonable and due care
to discover and correct the defect, warn against the potential dan-
ger, etc. By and large, strict liability in tort has eliminated these
obstacles of the plaintiff. It is for this and several other reasons that
the doctrinal shift from negligence to strict liability in the product
liability area has been hailed as a "revolution."
Both this doctrinal shift and the theme of the "tension" between
negligence and strict liability serve to give the impression that there
is a fundamental difference between these two standards of liability
in tort. Moreover, this difference is thought to extend not only to
the legal significance of these two bases of product liability, in
terms of such matters as evidence, proof and burden, but also to
their economic significance. Courts, as well as editors of law case
books and authors of law journal articles almost universally attrib-
ute significant and different economic consequences to negligence
and strict tort liability.
The reason for this impression, both in contemporary judicial
decisions as well as in the professional literature, may be due in
large part to the exposition by Judge Traynor in his concurring
opinion in Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of the reasons why
the "manufacturer's negligence should no longer be singled out as
217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
59 Cal.2d 57, 377 P.2d 897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
It is interesting to note Judge Traynor's view of the role and significance of Judge Car-
dozo's opinion in MacPherson to wit:
Judge Cardozo's reasoning recognized the injured person as the real party in inter-
est and effectively disposed of the theory that the liability of the manufacturer
incurred by his warranty should apply only to the immediate purchasers. It thus
paves the way for a standard of liability that would make the manufacturer guaran-
tee the safety of his product even when there is no negligence.
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436, 442 (1944).
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the basis of a plaintiff's right to recover in cases like the present
one." 7 As every student of the subject has come to appreciate, Judge
Traynor's statement has easily become the best known and most
frequently cited judicial exposition of the principal justification for
abandoning negligence as the basis for liability in products injury
cases and adopting a standard of strict liability in tort.
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR STRICT PRODUCT LIABILITY
Proof of negligence in product liability cases is often very diffi-
cult, if not impossible. By 1963, application of the doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur had been stretched to where it was tantamount to the
imposition of the principle of strict liability. Moreover, strict liabil-
ity was, in effect, already the standard and basis for liability in cases
brought under a breach of warranty theory. For these reasons, Judge
Traynor felt strict liability should replace negligence as the basis for
liability in products injury cases.'
In addition, the manufacturer is in the best position to minimize
the risk of harm and loss due to product related injuries, in part
because the manufacturer is responsible for the product design and
in part because he is in a better position to assure the integrity of
1 24 Cal.2d 453, 150 P.2d 436 (1944) (restaurant waitress severely injured by exploding
bottle of Coca-Cola while placing bottle in refrigerator).
An injured person, however, is not ordinarily in a position to refute such evi-
dence or identify the cause of the defect, for he can hardly be familiar with the
manufacturing process as the manufacturer himself is. In leaving it to the jury to
decide whether the inference has been dispelled, regardless of the evidence against
it, the negligence rule approaches the rule of strict liability. It is needlessly circui-
tous to make negligence the basis of recovery and impose what is in reality liability
without negligence. If public policy demands that a manufacturer of goods be
responsible for their quality regardless of negligence there is no reason not to fix
that responsibility openly.
Id. at 441 (Traynor, J.).
An additional and more recent justification for strict liability is that by moving from a
negligence to a strict liability standard, administrative and adjudicative costs will be re-
duced. This result is not at all clear, in theory or fact. Although the issues and uncertainties
surrounding litigation might be fewer and simpler under strict liability than under a negli-
gence standard, the scope of liability is greater. Moreover, because strict product liability
has the effect of increasing the likelihood that manufacturers will be held liable for product
related accidents, the number of claims and court cases will, for this reason alone, increase.
And, since strict liability also increases the injured plaintiff's likelihood of prevailing at trial,
the amount of money the plaintiff (or time his lawyer) is willing to spend on litigation is likely
to increase. Accordingly, neither the direction nor the magnitude of change in administrative
and adjudicative costs, including the costs of litigation are at all clear. The available empiri-
cal evidence suggests that, in fact, these costs have increased dramatically in recent years.
Over one million claims were brought for product related injuries in 1976, with over half these
claims involving litigation.
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the actual production of the product, through inspection and other
means of quality assurance and control.' Furthermore, the manufac-
turer is better able to "spread" the loss attendant a product related
injury and distribute the cost of such accidents among the consum-
ers of the particular product, by increasing prices to cover the cost
of such losses and damage judgments (self-insurance) or the cost of
product liability insurance."' Finally, by holding the manufacturer
strictly liable, he will have a greater economic incentive to design
and produce safer products."
The courts had, by 1963, applied a standard of strict liability in
cases involving injury to consumers of food stuffs and food products
for a number of decades. Since there is no theoretical or practical
basis upon which to differentiate as between food and other con-
sumer products, logic as well as judicial precedent appeared to call
for the extension of a rule of strict manufacturer liability to all
products, food and non-food alike.'2
Even if there is no negligence, however, public policy demands that responsibility
be fixed whenever it will most effectively reduce the hazards to life and health
inherent in defective products that reach the market. The consumer no longer has
means or skill enough to investigate for himself the soundness of a product, even
when it is not contained in a sealed package, and his erstwhile vigilance has been
lulled by the steady efforts of manufacturers to build up confidence by advertising
and marketing devices such as trademarks.
Escola at 440, 443 (Traynor, J.).
Those who suffer injury from defective products are unprepared to meet its
consequences. The cost of an injury and the loss of time or health may be an
overwhelming misfortune to the person injured, and a needless one, for the risk of
injury can be insured by the manufacturer and distributed among the public as a
cost of doing business.
Id. at 441.
It is to the public interest to discourage. the marketing of products having
defects that are a menace to the public. If such products nevertheless find their way
into the market it is to the public interest to place the responsibility for whatever
injury they may cause upon the manufacturer, who, even if he is not negligent in
the manufacture of the product, is responsible for its reaching the market. Against
such a risk there should be general and constant protection and the manufacturer
is best situated to afford such protection.
Id.
,2 This court and many others have extended protection according to such a
standard to consumers of food products taking the view that the right of a consumer
injured by unwholesome food does not depend "upon the intricacies of the law of
sales" and that the warranty of the manufacturer to the consumer in absence of
privity of contract rests on public policy. Dangers to life and health inhere in other
consumers' goods that are defective and there is no reason to differentiate them
from the dangers of defective food products.
Id. at 442.
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A. Proof of Negligence
As to the first of the several justifications for the adoption of a rule
of strict product liability, namely the easing of the plaintiff's bur-
den of proof, there may be some doubt. It is true that the plaintiff
no longer need establish privity of contract, or prove either that the
defendant owed him a duty of care, or that the defendant manufac-
turer did not exercise reasonable care to discover and eliminate the
product defect. However, in pursuing his action on the basis of strict
liability the plaintiff still must establish the defect in the product,
prove either that the defect was the result of the defendant manu-
facturer's design and/or production process, or alternatively, that
the defect was present in the product at the time it left the manufac-
turer's control, and that the cause of his injury was the product's
defect. Moreover, traditional defenses such as assumption of risk,
product misuse and what in some cases has amounted to contribu-
tory negligence, remain very much a part of the law of product
liability, whether based on negligence or strict liability.
Of all the elements of the plaintiff's cause of action in strict liabil-
ity, perhaps the most difficult burden is that of proving that the
product in question was defective and that this was the cause of the
plaintiff's injury. In the absence of a defect in the product, whether
due to design, the production process or mistaken or inadequate
instructions and warnings, no liability for injury related to a product
will be found. Yet, in the proof of a product defect lies a task almost
equal in difficulty to the proof of a manufacturer's negligence. Prov-
ing product design defect(s) is, for all practical purposes, the equiv-
alent of proving the manufacturer's negligence in the design of the
product. As in a plaintiff's negligence cause of action, elements such
as custom in the industry, the cost and practicability of safer design,
the likelihood of the injury occurring and the like are present in a
product liability suit brought under strict liability.
The form in which courts of approximately forty jurisdictions
have adopted strict liability in product cases, namely the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 402A (1965), has led to the
reintroduction of some elements of negligence into the burden of
proof of a plaintiff bringing an action under strict liability.' 3 The
bifurcated standard implicit in section 402A has been read and
" Section 402A of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965): "One who sells any product
in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer or to his property is
subject to liability ... " (emphasis added).
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applied by many courts in such a manner as to require the plaintiff
to prove both that the product was defective and that the defect
rendered the product "unreasonably dangerous." Some courts, most
notably in California, have therefore expressly rejected this aspect
of the Restatement's formulation of the strict liability standard for
products and require only that the product's defect be established."4
This attempt to prevent returning to the negligence standard or, in
the opinion of others, to accelerate the shift from the negligence
standard has by no means been widely adopted outside of Califor-
nia.
B. Economic Justifications for Strict Liability
There appears to be an increasing awareness among the judiciary,
practicing attorneys and scholars in the field that the legal implica-
tions, in the form of the difficulty and burden of proof, of strict
product liability are not as "revolutionary" as they may at first have
appeared. The same is not true of what have become the accepted
economic justifications of the doctrine. The economic justifications
for strict liability, and for the shift from negligence to a strict liabil-
ity standard (as originally set forth by Judge Traynor in Escola),
remain an important and prominant part of the legal framework in
the product liability area.
The notions that (1) liability should be strictly assigned to the
manufacturer because he is the party in the "best position" to mini-
mize the risk of harm and loss due to product-related injuries, (2)
the manufacturer is better able to "spread" the loss attendant a
product-related injury and distribute the associated costs among
the consumers of the particular product, and (3) by holding the
manufacturer strictly liable he will have a greater economic incen-
tive to design and produce safer products, have become and remain
an integral part of the "public policy" justifications incorporated
into contemporary judicial decisions imposing strict liability on
11 In Cronin v. J. B. E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal.3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433 (1972),
although the court recognized that the "unreasonably dangerous" qualification was included
by Dean Prosser, the reporter for the RESTATEMENT, to preclude the manufacturer from be-
coming what amounts to an insurer of his product(s) with respect to all harm attendant their
use, even in the case of inherently or unavoidably dangerous products (e.g., drugs, alcohol,
automobiles), the court rejected § 402A's "unreasonably dangerous" language. The court in
Cronin felt that this language ". . . burdened the injured plaintiff with proof of an element
which rings of negligence. . ." and felt that the ". . . requirement that a plaintiff also prove
that the defect made the product 'unreasonably dangerous' places upon him a significantly
increased burden and represents a step backward in the area pioneered by this court."
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manufacturers of products. Perhaps not surprisingly, the relevant
professional literature presents a remarkably consistent preference
for the application of a strict liability standard, as opposed to the
negligence standard."' The justification for this preference almost
without exception revolves around what are thought to be the desir-
able "public policy" consequences of the assignment of liability
based on a strict liability rule.
The remainder of this Article provides a brief analysis of the
several justifications, largely economic, legal scholars and the judi-
ciary have (since Judge Traynor's concurring opinion in Escola) set
forth as the basis for strict product liability. Before turning to an
analysis of risk-minimization, loss-spreading and the question of
product safety, one must focus briefly on the essentials of the eco-
nomics of product liability.
1. The Basic Economics of Product Liability
The full economic cost to the consumer of a product is the nomi-
nal, or pecuniary price he pays for the product plus the expected
accident cost."6 The latter is equivalent to Judge Hand's formulation
of the economic benefit to be gained by avoiding an accident:
namely, the product of the probability of an accident occurring and
the magnitude of the loss, measured in pecuniary terms, given that
the accident in fact occurs."7 Because the cost of a product to the
consumer is made up of these two cost elements, neither the elimi-
nation of the privity limitation beginning with MacPherson and
culminating in Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,"5 nor the
imposition of strict liability, have had the pervasive and significant
affects claimed.
Whether the manufacturer is or is not in privity with the con-
sumer, and is not or is thereby shielded from liability, or whether a
manufacturer is subject to a negligence or strict liability standard,
he will, if he is profit maximizing, incorporate into his price and sell
to the consumer cost justified product safety features. Moreover, as
11 See Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE L. J. 1055
(1972); Fletcher, Fairness and tility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REv. 537 (1972); and
Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 151 (1973).
" It should be noted that this is an accurate statement of the cost of a product-price plus
expected accident cost-for a customer who has no positive (risk assuming) or negative (risk
averting) propensity to incur or avert risk (a so-called "risk-neutral" consumer).
" See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947) and Conway v.
O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1940).
" 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960).
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shall be seen, regardless of the liability standard, and historically,
whether or not the privity limitation eliminated or substantially
reduced the likelihood of the manufacturer being held liable, he will
sell only cost justified product safety features to the consumer. Per-
haps the simplest means of illustrating this proposition is by way
of an arithmetic example. 9
Irrespective of privity (or any other limitations with respect to a
manufacturer's liability), or whether liability is imposed according
to a negligence or strict liability standard, manufacturers will have
an economic incentive to incorporate cost justified product safety
features, and not to incorporate product safety features which are
not cost justified.'" By incorporating cost justified product safety
features the manufacturer effectively lowers the total cost of the
product to the consumer, which under most market conditions will
enable the manufacturer to increase prices, and thereby increase
profits.
Assume that the nominal (pecuniary) price of a product is $20 and
the expected accident cost $0.20. The total cost to the consumer is
$20.20, if the consumer is "risk neutral." In the extreme, if the
manufacturer were able to eliminate all the product's defects and
hazards, and incorporate such safety features as would make the
product "perfectly safe," he would be able to raise his price to the
consumer by $0.20. The consumer would be willing to pay a price
of $20.20 for the product, if it were "perfectly safe" and the expected
accident cost were therefore zero.
More realistically, we might suppose that the manufacturer is
able to reduce only the likelihood of an accident being "caused" by
his product, and/or reduce the severity of the related injury if an
accident occurs. Thus, if the manufacturer in the above example
could, by designing and incorporating certain product safety fea-
tures, reduce the expected accident cost from $0.20 to say $0.10, at
a cost to the manufacturer of say $0.06, he should be able to increase
his price to the consumer by $0.10, to $20.10. The total cost of the
,1 For a lucid examination of the operative economic principles, in the context of a simple
arithmetic statement, see Posner, Strict Liability: A Comment, 2 J. LEGAL STUDIES 205 (1973);
R. POSNER, ECONowc ANALYSIS OF LAW (1972).
" It should be noted that the term "cost justified" simply means that the resource cost of
incorporating the product safety feature is less than the corresponding price, or increase in
price, which the consumer of the product ("the market") is willing to pay therefor. Alterna-
tively, "cost justified" can also be taken to mean the situation where the cost to the manufac-
turer of incorporating the product safety feature is less than the corresponding cost to the
customer.
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product to the consumer remains the same ($20.20), a price of $20.10
and a (reduced) expected accident cost of $0.10. However, the man-
ufacturer's per unit profits have increased by $0.04. By incurring an
increase in costs of $0.06 per unit, the manufacturer has been able
to increase his price by $0.10 per unit."'
2. An Insurance Analogy
Before turning to the analysis of the several specific justifications
for strict product liability, it may be helpful to consider briefly the
shift from a negligence standard in the context of an insurance
analogy. One way is to view what was previously called "the ex-
pected accident cost" as the equivalent of an insurance premium.
The consumer in the above example, where the manufacturer was
able to completely eliminate the product's potential hazards
through the incorporation of appropriate safety features, was willing
to pay the manufacturer a price of $20.20. The consumer ought to
be indifferent whether he pays the manufacturer an additional $0.20
for eliminating the likelihood of an accident occurring, or pays an
insurance carrier the equivalent in the form of an insurance prem-
ium, thereby transferring the risk.
Viewed in this context, it becomes clear that strict liability with
product defect, and, in the extreme, strict liability without product
defect, essentially increases the probability (to a limit of one) that
the manufacturer will be held liable for all injuries resulting from
accidents related to the use of his product, regardless of any sur-
rounding circumstances. Through the application of liability assign-
ment rules, manufacturers can be (are) forced to sell products in a
"package." The latter is made up of the product itself and a more
or less comprehensive, full coverage insurance policy insuring
against the risk of accident and injury related to the particular
product. The product price must, and for those firms remaining in
business will, cover the manufacturing cost of the product plus the
insurance premium or costs of self-insurance, to cover the damages
"caused" by the product in its use by the average consumer.
Since the insurance premium costs implicit in such a "tied" prod-
uct package necessarily reflect the damages incurred by and paid
to the average consumer, it is likely that there will be some inciden-
tal economic effects. That is to say, only if manufacturers were in a
21 The exact magnitude of the increase in profits will, of course, depend largely on the
demand conditions prevailing in the product market.
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position to identify those consumers who sustained higher than av-
erage accident rates and damage costs, and charge them higher
product prices, would the shift to strict liability not affect the levels
and "mix" of safe and un-safe products. However, as a practical
matter, manufacturers are not able to price discriminate in this
manner.
The shift from a negligence standard to strict liability has proba-
bly resulted in fewer and less dangerous products. The shift has just
as probably resulted in higher product prices, in that it generally
requires resources (costs) to design and produce safer products. Al-
though primary accident costs may thereby be reduced, accident
prevention costs are likely to have increased. Since the insurance
premium costs implicit in the product price reflect the damages
incurred by and compensation paid to the average consumer, the
shift to strict product liability has necessarily involved a redistribu-
tion of wealth from consumers experiencing low product-related
accident rates and incurring low damages to consumers experienc-
ing high product-related accident rates and incurring high damages.
Finally, it may be argued that since strict product liability
amounts to the sale of a "tied" product package consisting of the
product and full insurance protection, consumers will have less in-
centive to exercise due and reasonable care in the selection and use
of products. Whether or not consumers actually have less incentive
to exercise care in the selection and use of products under a strict
standard of manufacturer's liability, it seems clear that if consum-
ers are subject to a lower probability of bearing the costs of product-
related accidents, hazardous products will be less unattractive to
consumers.2 This being the case, the quantity of such products
demanded at any given price will be greater, relative to the quantity
of such hazardous products demanded at any given price under a
standard less strict, where the probability of the consumer bearing
the cost of accidents is higher. 23 Moreover, since under a strict liabil-
ity standard manufacturers do face a higher likelihood of being held
liable, and accordingly are more likely to carry and pay for insur-
ance (or simply self-insure and pay the damage awards), hazardous
products will be associated with higher costs at any given level of
output of such products.24 It is in this sense that strict product
See McKean, Products Liability: Implications of Some Changing Property Rights, 84
Q.J. ECON. 611 (1970).
" In more technical economic terms, the demand function will shift to the right.
24 The supply function will shift to the left.
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liability is likely to have the effect of reducing the supply (the
quantity supplied at any given price) of hazardous products.
However, because both the demand and supply functions of haz-
ardous products shift, it cannot be inferred that the quantity of
defective and dangerous products produced will decline, at least not
as the result of the shift from a negligence to a strict liability stan-
dard. Nevertheless, it will be the case that under a strict product
liability standard, consumers will pay higher products prices be-
cause they will face a forced "tie in" sale of the product plus insur-
ance. Strict liability compels the manufacturer to provide the con-
sumer with insurance coverage against the risk of injury attendant
product-related accidents, where the accident is the result of a non-
negligent defect in the product. From the consumer's point of view,
he is precluded from either assuming the risk attendant relatively
hazardous (and less expensive) products, or self-insuring and ob-
taining his own insurance coverage. 5
A more detailed analysis of the three primary "public policy"
justifications traditionally underlying both judicial decisions and
legal commentaries on strict liability of the manufacturers of prod-
ucts will now be presented. For purposes of discussion, the formula-
tion first set forth by Judge Traynor in Escola will serve as a conven-
ient starting point.
3. The Manufacturer is in the Best Position to Minimize the
Risk of Harm and Loss Due to Product Related Injuries
From a resource allocative perspective, the question of which
party (to an accident producing event) "ought" to bear the costs of
the product related accident should be framed within the principle
that liability assignment rules should be constructed to provide for
an economically efficient result. Given the maxim that resources are
finite, it follows that there is an economically efficient level of re-
= As noted by Richard Posner in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW, supra note 19, the only
circumstances in which this will increase economic efficiency - reduce resource costs - is if
the manufacturer is a more efficient (lower cost) insurance carrier than commercial insurance
companies specializing in product liability underwriting and if the consumer actually wants
to purchase insurance coverage, rather than assume the risk of product-related accidents, i.e.,
wants to self-insure. The consumer would have an incentive to self-insure if he is the more
efficient (lower cost) accident insurer, as may well be the case in a wide variety of instances.
Moreover, if in fact the manufacturer, rather than either a commercial insurance carrier or
the consumer himself, is the more efficient (lower cost) insurer, the manufacturer will have
an economic incentive to provide insurance coverage for the buyers of his products even in
the absence of strict liability.
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sources which manufacturers and consumers should devote to de-
signing and producing safer products. This economically efficient
level is where the sum of the primary costs of accidents-namely,
property damage, medical expenses and lost earnings-and the cost
of safety and of preventing and avoiding product-related accidents,
is minimized. The answer to the question "how much safety is
enough" is the point at which the combined cost of accidents and
safety and preventive measures is minimum.2"
One of the primary objectives of any system of accident law, in
addition to compensation, should be to assign the rules used to
assign liability in such a way as to encourage the "production" of
an economically efficient level of both safety and safe products. To
the extent that courts and legislatures assign liability for product-
related accidents to the party with the lower accident prevention
and avoidance costs, economic efficiency is served. Society is moved
closer to the point at which the joint costs of accidents and accident
prevention and avoidance costs are minimized. It is at this point
that society as a whole is devoting the economically efficient level
of resources to accident prevention and product safety.
The only meaningful sense in which manufacturers may be in the
"best" position to minimize the risk of harm and loss due to
product-related injuries is that manufacturers may be able to do so
more efficiently (at lower cost) than the wholesaler, retailer or con-
sumer." There is no question that for some, perhaps many, prod-
ucts, the manufacturer is indeed the most efficient accident preven-
ter. In the case of many products, it is least costly for the manufac-
turer to engage in accident prevention by designing and producing
a (safer) product and incorporating cost-justified safety features. A
good example of this is the drug manufacturer's ability to warn the
physician (and thereby indirectly the consumer) with respect to the
potentially harmful side effects of using a particular drug. There can
", For a comprehensive exposition of this point see G. CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS
(1970).
" As we have already noted, Judge Traynor's choice of words in his concurring opinion in
Escola which speaks of minimizing rather than "optimizing" the risk of harm and injury, is
unfortunate, particularly because this language has been freely and broadly adopted by the
legal community. The proper objective is not to minimize these risks. There is no question
that save for a relatively small category of so-called "unavoidable accidents" (ones which
cannot be prevented whatever amount of resources devoted to prevention), all accidents could
be avoided if we were willing to devote sufficient resources to the task. The question, however,
is at what cost? Accordingly, the proper statement of the objective is that such risks as those
addressed by Judge Traynor should be "optimized."
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be little, if any, question that the drug manufacturer is in a better,
or even "best", position to do so. His knowledge of the chemistry
and toxicity of the drug, the relatively low cost of providing ade-
quate warnings by labeling, product literature, and the like, are
among the factors supporting this argument.
It is equally certain that for other products, probably a significant
number, the consumer and product user is the most efficient acci-
dent preventer or avoider. It may be significantly less costly for the
consumer to devote resources, including time, to accident preven-
tion or avoidance. One example is in product use. Although the
manufacturer may be able to foresee and hence warn against certain
types of product applications or uses which are or may be danger-
ous, it has been extremely difficult and costly for manufacturers to
foresee the multitude and variety of uses to which consumers will
put certain types of products.28 Furthermore, the consumer or prod-
uct user is likely to be in a better and very likely the "best" position
to know how he intends to use the particular product, and thus
prevent or avoid accidents that are related to the product and result
from its misuse.
Precisely because the difficulty and cost of preventing and avoid-
ing accidents is not, generally, the same for each party, manufac-
turer and consumer, one particular liability assignment rule can and
will be more efficient than another. As already noted, to the extent
that such rules are fashioned to assign liability for product-related
accidents to the party with the lower accident prevention or avoid-
ance costs, whether that party is the manufacturer or the consumer,
economic efficiency is served. Placing the incentive for risk preven-
tion on the party best able to implement risk prevention techniques
is, or should be, the equivalent of placing liability for product-
related accidents on the party whose costs of accident prevention or
avoidance are lowest.
4. The Manufacturer is Better Able to "Spread" the Loss
Attendant a Product Related Injury
One sense in which the manufacturer may be better able to
" Product liability litigation and the reporting of these cases is replete with what are often
nothing less than astounding examples of product misuse. First year law students read the
case (or its equivalent) where the defendant manufacturer was held liable for inadequate
instructions/warnings as to product use in that he failed to warn against the use of a power
lawn mower to trim hedges and other shrubbery and the plaintiff in fact so used the product
and was injured when he dropped the lawn mower on his foot.
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"spread" the primary costs of accidents is in the insurance or under-
writing context already discussed. However, as was true in the con-
text of risk prevention, this ability to spread costs may or may not
be the case. Whether this is the case in any particular instance will
depend upon the particular product, as well as on the particular
manufacturer. However, there is no a priori or theoretical basis to
presume that manufacturers are more efficient (lower cost) "loss
spreaders" than either commercial insurance underwriters or con-
sumers.
The other possible basis for offering "loss-spreading" as a justifi-
cation for imposing strict liability on manufacturing enterprises is
that it is socially desirable to shift the burden of the cost of acci-
dents from the unfortunate injured individual to a larger number of
persons. Although it may be an appealing notion morally, the idea
that shifting a large loss from the individual accident victim to a
group of individuals (each of whom bears only a small fraction of
the total accident cost) increases economic welfare has no basis in
economic theory. 29
This more or less moralistic view of the accident law system, and
of what specific rules of liability assignment should accomplish, has,
unfortunately, led to the widely held view that the primary cost of
product-related accidents should be imposed on the party "best
able" to absorb such costs. This party is more often than not the
manufacturer, irrespective of whether he is able to pass such costs
on to the consumers of the particular product in the form of higher
prices. If the manufacturer cannot pass on the costs, as determined
primarily by the characteristics of the market demand for the par-
ticular product, then he will "absorb" the cost of product-related
accidents. To the extent that this results in lower profits, the owners
of the manufacturing enterprise, namely the stockholders, will
"absorb" these costs, in the form of lower dividends and/or lower
capital gains income.
Characterization of the principles of negligence law in moral
terms does not advance our analysis and understanding of the liabil-
ity assignment rule. Strict liability, certainly no less than a negli-
gence standard, is an objective standard.30 "Deep pocket" rules of
2 The literature of economics has dealt extensively with this subject. The notion that the
total welfare loss of say one hundred persons, each incurring a $1 cost, is less than that of
one person incurring a $100 cost stems from the misapplication of the concept of the diminish-
ing marginal utility of money.
o For an excellent exposition of this point, see Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL
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liability assignment, or any rule imposing liability for accident
damages on the basis of which party "ought" to pay, or is "best
able" to pay, reflect the moral judgments of judges, juries, or legisla-
tures as to the proper distribution of wealth. Just as descriptive
terms such as "fault", "blame" and "responsibility" do not, or
should not, play a role in a negligence standard for the assignment
of liability, so too terms such as "ought" (to pay) or "best able" (to
pay) serve no useful purpose with respect to a discussion of a strict
liability standard. To whom the costs of product-related accidents
"belong" and whether the manufacturer or consumer bears those
costs, are questions neither relevant to nor helpful in the task of
developing an economically efficient set of liability assignment rules
in the context of our system of accident law.
Even if "loss spreading" were economically beneficial, or if so-
ciety determined that such "loss spreading" was desirable, neither
strict liability nor negligence appears the preferable rule to achieve
this goal. Under strict liability, the manufacturer will pass on and
so "spread" the cost of accidents among consumers, in the form of
higher prices, to cover product liability insurance premiums and
damages for which the firm is self-insured. Where manufacturers
are held liable only for their negligent acts involving products, con-
sumers could insure themselves against uncompensated accidents
and injuries attending the use of defective or dangerous products.
In this case, the accident costs and "loss spreading" would be
among the customers of commercial insurance carriers. As pre-
viously noted, only if there is some reason to believe that manufac-
turers are more efficient (lower cost) insurers than consumers would
a rule of strict liability assignment be preferable to negligence for
"loss spreading" purposes.
STUDIES 30 (1972). One of the earliest, and certainly one of the most widely adopted defini-
tions of negligence, namely that of Judge Hand in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159
F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947), clearly makes negligence an objective standard. Under the Hand
formula, if the product of the probability of an accident's occurrence and the cost of injury
and loss, given that the accident occurs, is greater than the cost of preventing or avoiding
the accident, the failure to take the necessary precautions - and incurring the cost attendant
thereto-will be held to be negligent. Hand's formulation of the negligence standard, and
what constitutes behavior amounting to a breach of a standard of due care, is essentially an
economic formulation. The Hand formula simply states that if an expected accident cost of
say $1,000 can be prevented or avoided by the expenditure of $900, it will be held to be
negligent not to do so because in so doing, $100 of resources can be "saved."
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5. By Holding the Manufacturer Strictly Liable, He Will Have
a Greater Economic Incentive to Design and Manufacture Safer
Products
A basic premise implicit in and underlying this justification for
imposing strict liability on manufacturers is that a function, both
of our system of accident law and of how liability assignment rules
impose accident costs, is to regulate safety.' Although the past
decade has brought an increase of no small proportions in the direct
government regulation of safety, from the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration to the Consumer Products Safety Commis-
sion, there is no question that the legal system's development of
private causes of action can serve as an alternative to direct govern-
ment regulation of safety. However, although regulation of safety
may be implicit in Judge Traynor's exposition of the justifications
for strict product liability, this view is not universally held by either
the judiciary or legal scholars.32 An equally, if not more widely held
view is that the primary purpose of our, or any, system of accident
law, whether operating under rules of negligence or strict liability,
is to compensate accident victims for the primary cost of injury,
including medical expenses, loss of earnings and pain and suffer-
ing. 33
A second theme running through the "safety justification" for the
doctrinal shift from negligence to strict liability is that the effect of
this shift has been to "internalize" the cost of accidents and
product-related injuries. By so "internalizing" accident costs, the
manufacturer is explicitly forced to take into account these costs
(because they are now "his") in decisions regarding product design,
manufacture and distribution.34 However, as already seen, to whom
" That is to say, a function of accident law is to develop a set of rules for the assignment
of liability which will provide economic incentives among the various parties to engage in the
economically efficient level of accident prevention and avoidance.
11 For an incisive analysis of this position - that the primary function of our system of
accident law is compensation - and how universally this view is held in the context of what
has been described as the "orthodox" view of negligence, see Posner note 30 supra.
'I It is interesting to note that historically, and among some of the most influential legal
scholars of the time, compensation was not regarded as being even an ancillary function of
the accident law system. See 0. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW (1881) and Holmes, Trespass
and Negligence, 14 AM. L. REV. 1, 15-20 (1880).
11 Historically, until approximately the beginning of the nineteenth century, liability for
the damages resulting from an accident producing interaction between parties was assigned
quite irrespective of fault. Liability was tantamount to being strict in the modern sense. With
the industrialization of the nineteenth century, what amounted to a "no fault" standard of
liability was abandoned in favor of a negligence standard. One of the justifications for this
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the cost of the accident belongs and which party bears the cost, are
questions that are neither relevant to nor helpful in a discussion of
either accident law or the differences between negligence and strict
liability. 5 In the context of our earlier discussion, the relevant ques-
tion is which party is the more efficient, that is lower cost, accident
preventer or avoider.
At one extreme, under a system of caveat emptor and no manu-
facturer liability, consumers have a strong incentive to undertake
safety measures that cost less than the relevant expected accident
cost. However, under such a system, manufacturers are seen as
having little if any incentive to design and incorporate safety fea-
tures into their products. At the other extreme, under a system of
caveat venditor and strict manufacturer liability, manufacturers
have a strong incentive to engage in safety measures and produce
safe products. However, under such a system, consumers may have
little if any incentive to undertake safety measures and precautions
to avoid accidents. It becomes increasingly apparent that the justifi-
cation for strict liability, that safer products will necessarily be
produced as a result, is largely spurious.
As previously mentioned, given that the cost of a potentially haz-
ardous product to the consumer is the sum of the product price and
the expected accident cost, quite independent of the liability assign-
ment rule, the profit-maximizing manufacturer will have an eco-
nomic incentive to incorporate cost justified safety features into his
product. By so doing, the manufacturer is in a position to lower the
total cost of the product to the consumer, and thus sell a greater
quantity and/or raise his price, resulting in higher total profits.
Conversely, in those instances where the consumer is able to prevent
or avoid the accident at a cost less than that incurred by the manu-
facturer, the consumer will have an economic incentive to do so
because he will enjoy the product at a cost lower (price plus ex-
pected accident cost) than if the manufacturer engaged in the safety
measure(s).
nineteenth century doctrinal shift was that the so-called "infant industries" of the time
required what amounted to subsidies. It was thought that by moving from what amounted
to a "no fault" system to a negligence standard such a subsidy would be provided. Accident
costs would be "externalized" and shifted from the enterprise which "caused" the accidents,
through hazardous products and dangerous working conditions, to consumers and workers.
1' As noted by Richard Posner ". . the relevant question from the standpoint of economic
analysis is who could prevent the loss at lower cost, not whose cost the damage 'really' is."
See R. POSNER, note 19 supra, at 137.
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The question is, however, will the imposition of strict liability, or
in the extreme, strict product liability without defect, lead the man-
ufacturer to do any more than engage in cost justified safety
measures? Will strict liability serve to create economic incentives
for the manufacturer to design and produce products which are safer
than those which he would design and produce under a negligence
standard?
Imposing strict liability on manufacturers leads the manufacturer
to take into account the primary cost of accidents "caused" by his
product(s) and compare that cost with the cost of designing and
producing a safer product. The primary accident costs will be the
manufacturer's estimate of the judgments and damage awards he
will have to pay, if he self-insures, or the cost of product liability
insurance. However, neither the underlying economics nor the profit
maximization incentives of the manufacturer will be changed, or
"over-ridden", by alternative liability assignment rules. As already
noted, even if the prevailing system of accident law imposed no
liability on manufacturers, they would nevertheless have an eco-
nomic incentive to incorporate cost justified safety features into
their products because they could increase their profits. However,
the manufacturer has no different or greater incentive under a strict,
or even absolute, liability standard. He will not, as a result, make
his product any safer than would be the case if he were not held
liable.
Since strict liability "internalizes" primary accident costs, the
manufacturer will compare these to the costs of accident prevention,
that is, the cost of making his product safer. However, if the manu-
facturer is profit-maximizing, he will choose to pay the judgments
and damages for accidents "caused" by his products where these
costs are less than the cost of preventing the accident, that is, the
cost of designing or producing a safer product. The similarity to the
negligence standard is striking. If a manufacturer is profit-
maximizing, and if the expected cost of an accident (or class of
accidents related to a given product) is less than the cost of accident
prevention, the manufacturer will choose to pay the tort judg-
ment(s) for injuries sustained by consumers, rather than incur the
greater cost of preventing the accident and thereby avoiding liabil-
ity.36
:11 It is precisely for this economic reason that even under an absolute liability assignment
rule, product related accidents will occur. It is simply "economical" to allow some accidents
to happen, even where the expected accident cost may appear to be high. There is an
[Vol. 8:259
PRODUCT LIABILITY-ECONOMIC VIEW
II. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, it seems reasonably clear that the difference be-
tween a negligence standard and strict liability, at least with respect
to the safety/accident "mix", will not be significantly different. The
level of safety and accidents and the cost of accidents, are not likely
to differ significantly between the two standards. Products are not
apt to change dramatically as to their safety characteristics. Nor is
the cost of products to the consumer, namely the price plus the
expected accident cost, likely to change significantly, if at all, by
virtue of the shift from negligence to strict liability. Although the
expected accident cost may decrease, the price of the product is
likely to increase in a manner resulting in approximately the same
total cost to the consumer. 7 However, even though the choice of
liability assignment rules is not likely to result in any significant
change in safety and accident levels, product safety characteristics,
or the cost of products to the consumer, this doctrinal shift is likely
to have at least one important economic effect. Since strict liability
essentially forces manufacturers to insure customers against injuries
and property damage "caused" by defective products in the absence
of negligence, whether resource allocative efficiency increases or
decreases as a result will depend on whether manufacturers are
lower cost accident insurers than commercial insurance underwri-
ters and whether the consumer prefers to purchase the insurance
implicit in the product price, or would rather self insure. 38
This Article has focused on the economic costs and benefits of
what are commonly thought to be two very different standards or
rules of liability assignment, negligence and strict liability. As dem-
onstrated, the differences in both law and economics are fewer
rather than more, less rather than greater, and more apparent than
real. Undoubtedly, the doctrinal shift from negligence to strict prod-
"optimum," economically efficient level of product related accidents. Even if liability assign-
ment rules are developed to ostensibly induce (or force) manufacturers to design and produce
safer products, such rules are not likely to reduce the number of accidents below this level.
" However, consumers are forced to purchase safer products. To the extent that consumers
of a particular product are risk preferring, and do not value highly the decrease in the
probability of the product "causing" an accident, they will be worse off under a rule of strict
liability. Such risk preferring consumers are not willing to pay for product safety features
which cost less than the expected accident cost which could be avoided by the safety features.
Moreover, if in fact many consumers are risk preferrers, as is likely to be the case for certain
products (e.g., skateboards), the level of safety and accidents may differ as between a negli-
gence and strict liability standard.
' For a further discussion of this point, see R. POSNFR, supra note 19, at 62, 111.
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uct liability has resulted in some changes within our system of
accident law. However, with respect to what ultimately "counts",
namely accident and safety levels, the changes are likely to have
been a great deal less than might have been envisioned by Judge
Traynor and others when the doctrine of strict liability was first
extended to non-food products approximately fifteen years ago.
